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Abstract—The network virus propagation is influenced by
various factors, and some of them are neglected in most of
the existed models in the literature. In this paper, we study
the network virus propagation based on the the epidemiological
viewpoint. We assume that nodes can be equipped with protection
against virus and the security of a node depends not only on his
protection strategy but also by those chosen by other nodes in the
network. A crucial aspect is whether owners of device, e.g., either
smartphones, machines or tablets, are willing to be equipped to
protect themselves or to take the risk to be contaminated in
order to avoid the payment for a new antivirus. We model the
interaction between nodes as a non-cooperative games where the
node has two strategies: either to update the antivirus or not. To
this aim, we provide a full characterization of the equilibria of
the game and we investigate the impact of the price of protection
on the equilibrium as well as the efficiency of the protection
at equilibrium. Further we consider more realistic scenarios in
which the dynamic of sources that disseminate the virus, evolves
as function of the popularity of virus. In this work, the interest in
the virus by sources evolves under the Influence Linear Threshold
(HILT) model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet continues to grow exponentially and many ap-
plications continue to multiply on the Internet, with immediate
benefits to end users. However, these network-based applica-
tions and services can pose security risks to devises. Recently
many attacks have been launched against business, users and
governments, that are attributed to some decentralized online
communities acting anonymously in a coordinated manner.
However, despite the important efforts spent by the many
security companies, researchers, and government institutes,
information systems security is still a great concern [1], [2].
One of important security risks is the propagation of some
sophistical virus in the internet in which each infected node
becomes a new source of infection. The problem of virus
propagation has been studied through huge papers focusing on
mainly on epidemic thresholds for real and realistic network
and immunization policies [3], [4], [5]. Many researchers have
taken help of the biological system to study the behavior of
spread of virus in a computer network and how to immune the
computer system [6]. These epidemic models were very useful
in network security modeling and immunization strategy.
To manage the network security, lots of efforts have been
devoted to study virus propagation and characteristics [7]. To
protect from the spread of virus in the network, nodes, e.g.,
either smartphones, machines or tablets, can use some anti-
virus software with curing tools. In existing research, there
are many perspectives to protect against network infections [8].
An important issue of protection is the frequency of the update
in order to provide a protection against new virus. But many
of the anti-virus applications are of server-client in which the
system may provide the last update especially when there is an
intensive epidemic of new virus. But an important fundamental
source of difficulty in developing efficient protection is the
difficulty to fully observe and control the network. As a conse-
quence, full control and observability is impossible, leading to
systems that are vulnerable to local as well as remote attacks.
Other factor has to be considered when evaluating the security
risk from virus, is the decentralized decision on the protection.
Indeed, the protection against virus is typically autonomous
nature of decision making in the network and the performance
of such security is usually made under the assumption that
nodes are willing to use an anti-virus for protection. But, a
crucial aspect is whether owners of devices are willing to
be equipped to protect them self or to take the risk to be
contaminated in order to avoid the payment for a antivirus.
Any successful security solution should consider those factors.
To date, the problem that attached the most attention from
the research community is how efficiency the protection
against the virus when the decisions are taken autonomously
by nodes according to the cost of antivirus as well as the risk
to be contaminated. In fact, the bigger the number of nodes
equipped with protection, the lower the infection probability
for a node without protection. We model the problem as
non-cooperative games in order to establish the behavior of
nodes against virus infection. Furthermore, we consider a
source S which propagates the virus through the network.
We are concerned with spread of sources that disseminate the
virus. In particular, we associate the dynamic of sources with
the popularity of virus which is measured by the number of
infected nodes at least one time. We model this influence
process using Homogeneous Influence Linear Threshold
(HILT) model [9]. The HILT model focuses on the threshold
behavior in influence propagation, which we can frequently
relate to when enough of our friends bought a product, we
may be influenced and converted to follow the same action.
In our context, when a virus reaches some level of popularity,
other sources may participate in dissemination of this virus.
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2Fig. 1. Transition condition of activation state.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
epidemic model and the network game is introduced in section
II. In section III, we study the dynamics and the different
equilibrium properties of the proposed security game. Numer-
ical illustrations of the system behaviors and the equilibrium
characteristics are given in Section IV. In order to enhance the
readability of the paper, the mathematical proofs are given in
Appendices.
II. NETWORK MODEL
Consider a sparse network that consists of a large population
of N computer systems (CS) or nodes. We assume that the
network is a complete graph where all computers can com-
municate with each others. A set of sources generates a virus
with a rate µs and nodes in the network becomes susceptible
to be infected by this virus. Each node i chooses or not to be
equipped in order to protect himself from the virus by paying
a relative price of protection. Mixed strategies, i.e, probability
distribution over the actions, are also possible. Obviously, all
nodes have an incentive to protect themselves until the virus
extinction. However, every antivirus update costs a price Uc.
Hence, the strategy adopted by a node corresponds to a certain
utility it receives and this utility depends on actions performed
by N nodes. Nodes with outdated antivirus are vulnerable to
the virus spread process, and lose an infection cost Ic if they
were infected. An infected node can recover after a curing
time using various tools (e.g., through a clean-up software).
Under this setting, nodes shall immunise themselves during
the period of the virus spread while minimizing the antivirus
update cost.
A. Modeling active sources evolution
Assume that there are a set of sources that generate the
virus. We associate the dynamic of active sources, which still
disseminate the virus, with the dynamic of the number of
infected nodes. In particular, we associate the dynamic of the
number of active sources with the popularity of virus which is
measured by the number of infected nodes at least one time.
We model this influence process using Homogeneous Influ-
ence Linear Threshold (HILT) model [9]. The HILT model
focuses on the threshold behavior in influence propagation.
The evolution of the number of active sources is modeled
following process evolving in continuous time. Each source
j chooses a random threshold θj from an arbitrary threshold
distribution with cumulative density function (c.d.f) F . Hence
a source becomes active if the popularity, which measured by
Fig. 2. Flow chart of states’ transitions.
the number of infected nodes, exceeds its threshold. An active
source disseminate the virus during a random time Tm, which
follows the exponential distribution with rate δS . Under the
HILT model, the following proposition describes the dynamic
of the number of actives sources at time t.
Proposition 1. The dynamic of the number of active sources
that disseminate the virus, is given by
S˙(t) = −δSS(t) + λ f(X¯(t))
1− F (X¯(t)) (N − S(t)),
where X¯(t) is the number of infected nodes till time t.
Proof: See appendix.
B. Modeling Infection Dynamic
To model the spreading process under the influence of
a curing process, we choose the SIS (Susceptible Infected
Susceptible) model, which is one of the most studied epidemic
models [10], [11]. A node at time t can be in one out of
two states: infected or susceptible. We assume that the curing
process is a Poisson process with rate δ, after which the node
becomes healthy, but susceptible again to the virus. Let X(t)
denote the number of infected nodes and each infected node
can infect healthy nodes with a contact rate β. Note that the
total infection rate of a susceptible node is β times the size
of infected nodes.
C. The Security Game
We consider a security game, in which nodes choose indi-
vidually whether or not to invest in the protection by updating
their antivirus versions. Indeed, nodes prefer to not invest in
antivirus update if the network is enough protected, i.e., there
is enough nodes in the network that have chosen to update.
Each node has two strategies: either to invest in the antivirus
protection, i.e., pure strategy update (U ), or not to invest, i.e.,
pure strategy not update (NU ). Each strategy corresponds to
certain playoff for the node. Notice that, a node may also be
protected by the other nodes’ update: the risk to be infected
decreases with the number of antivirus activated throughout
the network. Accordingly, the payoff of a node depends on
the actions performed by the N − 1 nodes.
We denote by Vj(kU ) the long term fitness of a computer,
given that it plays the strategy j ∈ {U,NU}, and that kU is
3the number of updated antivirus. The fitness is given by
Vj(kU ) =
{ −Uc j ∈ U
−PiIc j /∈ U (1)
where Pi is the probability to be infected until the virus
extinction.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
The nodes which invest in the antivirus protection are
directly immune to the virus. Therefore, they can not infect
the other nodes or be infected. The dynamic of sources S(t)
depends on the the virus popularity. The activation process
describes how the infectious nodes cause the inactive sources
to become active. A source j is influenced by the accumulative
number of infected nodes X¯ and it will be active when
X¯(t) ≥ θ (2)
We assume that a node contacts an active source with a rate
γ. Before evaluating the dynamics of the the infected nodes
XN (t), we study the dynamic of sources SN (t) under the
activation process.
A source S is active when the number of infected nodes X¯N (t)
reaches the target value θ. Let X¯(t) be the dynamic of infected
nodes disregarding the curing process. The dynamics of X¯(t)
is given by
˙¯X(t) = (βX(t) + γS(t))(N − kU −X(t))
Proof: See appendix.
Recall that SN (t) is the set of active sources which partici-
pate in the infection process by time t, and δSSN (t) is the set
of the sources which are no longer interested to the virus and
move from the active state to the susceptible state. A source is
influenced by the accumulative infection process with a rate λ.
By applying Condition (2), we can write the sources dynamics
as follows
S˙(t) = −δSS(t) + λ f(X¯(t))
1− F (X¯(t)) (N − S(t))
We know that the hazard function [12] for the c.d.f F (.) is
given by hF (x) =
f(x)
1−F (x) where f(x) is the corresponding
density function. Hence, the ordinary differential equation
(ODE) becomes
S˙(t) = −δSS(t) + λhF (X¯(t))(N − S(t))
Proof: See appendix.
The sources contact (N − kU −XN (t)) susceptible nodes
with a rate γ.Therefore, we can write the dynamics of X(t)
as following
X˙(t) = −δX(t) + (βX(t) + γS(t))(N − kU −X(t))
This growth equation gives the dynamics of infected nodes
under the sources activation process. All nodes aim to be
enough protected during the lifetime of the virus. A node i
can be infected by a source or by another infected node. The
infection probability Pi is expressed as follows
Pi(t) = 1−E
[∫ τc
0
e−(βx(t)+γS(t))dt
]
(3)
1) Pure Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 1. At a Nash equilibrium (NE), no player
can improve its fitness by unilaterally deviating from the
equilibrium.
For the proposed game a NE in pure strategies exists if and
only if the following two conditions are satisfied
∀1 ≤ j ≤ N =
{
Vj(NU, kU − 1) ≤ Vj(U, kU )
Vj(NU, kU ) ≥ Vj(U, kU + 1) (4)
We are interested in the existence and uniqueness of the
pure NE which is characterized by the number Ψ of players
investing in the antivirus.
A unique pure NE exists for the proposed security game when
Vj(NU,ψ) = Vj(U,ψ).
Proof: See appendix.
2) Mixed Nash Equilibrium: Let us now discuss the case
when every node maintain a probability distribution over the
two actions (U,NU). The advantage of this mixed equilibrium
compared to the pure one is that a node can invest in protection
only for a fraction of the time and stay susceptible the rest of
the time. This kind of equilibrium is more efficient for our
case because we study a homogeneous population with fixed
update and infection cost. In a mixed strategy game, a node i
can decide to invest in protection (playing U ) with probability
pi or keep protected only by his neighbors (playing NU ) with
probability (1− pi).
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ),∀ipi ≥ 0, is the mixed strategy profile.
For pi /∈ {0, 1} we have a fully mixed strategy profile. We
note (pi, p−i) if node i uses strategy pi and other use p−i =
(p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ).
We denote by Vj(p, p−i) the playoff of a node i which invest
in antivirus with probability p.
Definition 2. A mixed strategy p∗i ∈ [0, 1] is a NE if for each
player i (where i = 1, . . . , N ) we have
Ui(p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
i−1, p
∗
i , p
∗
i+1, ., p
∗
N ) ≥ Ui(p∗1, . . . , p∗i−1, pi, p∗i+1, . . . , p∗N )
(5)
for every mixed strategy pi ∈ [0, 1].
If ∀i, p∗i /∈ {0, 1} then we call p∗ fully mixed NE.
Every finite strategic game has a mixed strategy NE [13].
There exists a unique fully mixed NE p∗ for the proposed
game and it is solution of
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 (p
∗)k−1(1− p∗)N−kV (U, k) = 0 (6)
Proof: See appendix.
43) Equilibrium with Mixers and Non-Mixers: The mixers
are the players that choose a mixed strategy. We suppose
that a part of the population chooses to play a pure strategy
U or NU and the rest of the players are mixers. We will
study the existence of the equilibrium in this case. Let
NU ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} be the number of players choosing the
pure strategy U , and NNU ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} be the number of
players choosing the pure strategy NU .
The N − NU − NNU players use the mixed strategy. Let
p∗ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability with which the mixers choose
the strategy U . Moreover, we denote by VU (NU , NNU , p)
the fitness of the node who updates its antivirus and
VNU (NU , NNU , p) the fitness for the node who does not
update its antivirus. A necessary condition for the strategy
(NU , NNU , p
∗) to be a NE (with at list one mixer) is that the
mixer is indifferent whether it chooses a pure strategy U or
NU . This translates mathematically as follows
VU (NU + 1, NNU , p
∗) = VU (NU , NNU + 1, p∗) (7)
Proof: See appendix.
A unique NE of type (NU , NNU , p∗) exist for this case, and
is solution of
N−NU−NNU∑
k=0
CN−NU−NNUk−1 (p
∗)k−1
· (1− p∗)N−NU−NNU−kV (U,NU + k) = 0. (8)
We prove that this NE of type (NU , NNU , p∗) exists only
for NU < ψ and NU +NNU ≤ N − 2.
Proof: See appendix.
In this section, we have studied different NE types under
the S(t) activation process. We summarize the different Nash
equilibrium types as following:
• Pure Nash Equilibrium: There exists a unique NE when
the utility of U is equal to the utility of NU and we must
update exactly ψ nodes to get this equilibrium,
• Mixed Nash Equilibrium: A unique fully mixed NE p∗
exists and it is solution of Equation (6),
• Mixer and Non-Mixer Nash Equilibrium: We char-
acterize this equilibrium by a necessary condition (7).
A unique NE exists and it is solution of Equation (8).
Moreover, we have proved that a NE exists only for
NU < ψ and for NU +NNU ≤ N − 2.
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the
performances of the proposed security game. We first evaluate
the infection probability at the equilibrium. To do so we
solve Equation (6) to get the activation probability at the
equilibrium. We show how the activation and the infection
process depend on the system parameters, such as the number
of nodes N and the update cost Uc.
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Fig. 3. The infection process for different activation probabilities p, where
N = 100, Ns = 50, β = 1 × 10−3, γ = 1 × 10−3, δ = 1 × 10−1,
δS = 1 × 10−1, λ = 5 × 10−6, X(0) = 0, S(0) = 5, Ic = 1 and
Uc = 0.1.
A. System characteristics
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate the behavior of the infected
nodes X(t) and the sources S(t) as function of the time for
different activation probabilities (0.01, 0.1, 0.5) and a contact
rate β = 1× 10−3. We further take X(0) = 0 and S(0) = 5.
As expected, we remark a cause-effect phenomenon between
the nodes and sources. The number of infected nodes
increases as a result of the virus spread till reaching a given
infection rate. Then, when the virus popularity reaches a
certain level, the participating in the virus spread increases
yielding an increase in the number of sources.
In the proposed game model, activation probability is a
fundamental parameter and is related to how many nodes
install the new anti-virus software. To analyze effects of
the activation probability, p is set to three different values
(0.01, 0.1, 0.5). Fig. 3 shows that the number of infected
nodes X(t) slightly fluctuates before reaching a stable
(absorbing) state. In general, the higher the activation
probability is, the faster X(t) decreases. This is due to
the fact that increasing the activation probability implies a
decrease in the risk of being infected for susceptible nodes.
Notice that, depending on the activation probability, the virus
may disappear completely or become scars. We will discuss
this point later in the paper.
Fig. 4 depicts the dynamics of the interested sources in the
virus spread for different p. We clearly notice that, for low
activation probability values, e.g., p = 0.01, S(t) decreases
until the virus popularity reaches a target value. When the
activation probability increases to p = 0.5, we can see that
the number of sources are decreasing gradually to vanish
eventually.
Fig. 5 illustrates the time evolution of the infection probabil-
ity for different activation probabilities p. We remark that, from
p = 0.495, the infection probability monotonically decreases
till completely vanishing at t = 230. This suggests that using
an activation probability higher that 0.495 is worthless as, from
p = 0.495, the virus is going to disappear in any case.
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Fig. 4. Sources behaviour for different activation probabilities.
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Fig. 5. The infection probability for different activation probabilities, where
N = 100, β = 1× 10−3, γ = 1× 10−3, δ = 1× 10−1, δS = 1× 10−1,
λ = 1× 10−4, X(0) = 0, S(0) = 5, Ic = 1 and Uc = 0.1.
Unless otherwise stated, we will use the following parameters:
N = 500, Ns = 50, β = 1 × 10−4, γ = 1 × 10−3, δ = 0.1,
δS = 0.1, λ = 1 × 10−4, X(0) = 0, S(0) = 10, Ic = 1 and
Uc = 0.1. We notice by tf the time of epidemic extinction
corresponding to the time for which we have X(t) = 0. For
this parameters, a virus extinction time tf exists and we can
compute the infection probability in [0, . . . , tf ].
B. System Performances at the Equilibrium
1) Fully Mixed equilibrium : Let us now evaluate the per-
formances of the proposed security game. We characterize the
equilibrium in Section III by solving the polynomial Equation
in (6). We solve (6) to get a unique solution p∗ = 0.29 at the
equilibrium.
2) Mixer and Non-Mixer Equilibrium : For this case, we
have NU nodes that always update their antivirus (pure strat-
egy update) and NNU that never update their antivirus (pure
strategy not update). The N −NNU −NU mixers update the
antivirus with an activation probability p. Verifying Condition
(7), we vary the NU and the NNU to find the activation
probability for the mixers at the equilibrium. For N = 500
and Uc = 0.1, we get p∗ = 0.19 for all the mixers when
NU = 50 and NNU = 70.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Number of nodes
Ac
tiv
at
ion
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 
 
β/δ=3 10−2
β/δ=5 10−2
β/δ=8 10−2
epidemic
threshold
Fig. 6. The activation probability for increasing number of nodes.
C. Effects of network size
To proceed further with the analysis, we resort to evaluate
the impact of the network size on the system behavior at the
equilibrium.
In Fig. 6, we plot the activation probability as function
of the network size. It is clearly shown that the activation
probability increases when the network is larger which is
somehow obvious as a larger network tends to provide greater
risk of infection among nodes. On the other hand, we know
from [14] that the relation between the epidemic threshold
τc and the transmission to disease-induced mortality ratio βδ
translates to the following conditions:
• if βδ < τc, the virus dies out over time,
• if βδ > τc, the virus survives and the infection becomes
an epidemic.
In the particular case of a complete graph, the epidemic
threshold is given by τc = 1N−1 . Thus, in the proposed
network, the infection dies when N < δβ + 1. Increasing
β
δ , the number of nodes satisfying the epidemic threshold is
larger. This result gives incentive to companies to manage their
network parameters (β ,δ, N ) so that the infection dies out over
time.
To evaluate the performance of the equilibrium, we compare,
in Fig. 7, the gain G = UcN−p
∗UcN
UcN
to simpler policies where
one may activate a given percentage of the nodes in the system
depending on the general policy of the company. For instance,
a conservative policy is more likely to update 90% of the
nodes, whereas a lax policy is more likely to update 10% of
the entire nodes in the system.
So far, we have been interested in the influence of network
parameters (β, δ, N ) on the company server’s security man-
agement. Now, we will study how the network parameters
influence the antivirus producers decision.
D. Effects of update cost
Let us now study the impact of the update cost on the system
behavior at the equilibrium.
Fig. 8 gives the time evolution of the activation probability
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Fig. 7. The overall cost gain as function of the number of nodes.
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Fig. 8. The activation probability as function of the update cost.
considering different values of β/δ. We find the update cost
U∗c for which the probability of activation is equal to 0. This
specific value U∗c is very important for the antivirus producers
to manage the Uc, as approaching Uc the this limit value U∗c .
The U∗c increases with β/δ, as the risk of infection increases
with β/δ.
Fig. 9 illustrates the infection probability in [0, . . . , tf ] as
function of the update cost. At the equilibrium, the infection
probability increases with the update cost. This is justified
by the fact that the number of nodes participating in the
antivirus activation decreases as the update cost increases,
yielding a higher infection risk. In Fig. 10, we plot the infected
node evolution in time at the equilibrium considering different
update costs Uc. We observe that X(t) increases until a certain
t∗ and then it decreases till the epidemic extinction, i.e., when
X(t) = 0. It is shown that the more the update cost is lower,
the more the t∗ and the epidemic extinction are lower. This
result helps the antivirus producers to manage the update cost.
Increasing the Uc, we have more infected nodes in the network,
but reaching U∗c , no node is interested in the update. The
antivirus producers are interested to reach a target performance
of update cost to maximize the gain.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied a game theoretic model for network
virus protection under an activation process. The virus spread
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Fig. 9. The infection probability as function of the update cost.
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Fig. 10. Infected nodes for different update costs with N = 100, Ns = 50,
β = 1 × 10−4, γ = 1 × 10−3, δ = 0.1, δS = 0.1, λ = 1 × 10−4,
X(0) = 0, S(0) = 10 and Ic = 1.
dynamics is modelled as an epidemic process. The strategy of
each node is either to update or not to update the antivirus. We
have established the existence and the uniqueness of different
types of Nash equilibria. We have studied the dynamic of
both the infection process and the activation process. Both
the company server’s security management and the antivirus
producer’s strategies have been addressed. It has been shown
that, depending on the network topology, the companies have
incentive to manage their network parameters in order to
ensure that the infection dies out finite-time horizons.
APPENDIX
A. Dynamic of infected nodes
XN (t+ ∆t) = XN (t)(1− δ∆t)
+ (βNXN (t) + γNSN (t))(N − U −XN (t))∆t
XN (t+ ∆t)−XN (t)
∆t = −δXN (t)
+ (βNXN (t) + γNSN (t))(N − U −XN (t))
We evaluate this expression for ∆t → 0 to get:
X˙(t) = −δX(t) + (βX(t) + γS(t))(N − U −X(t))
7X¯N (t+ ∆t) = X¯N (t)
+ (βNXN (t) + γNSN (t))(N − U −XN (t))∆t
X¯N (t+ ∆t)− X¯N (t)
∆t = (β
NXN (t) + γNSN (t))(N −
U −XN (t))
We evaluate this expression for ∆t → 0 to get:
˙¯X(t) = (βX(t) + γS(t))(N − U −X(t))
B. Dynamic of the active sources
SN (t+ ∆t) = SN (t)(1− δS∆t)
+ λ
F (X¯N (t+ ∆t))− F (X¯N (t))
1− F (X¯N (t)) (NH − S
N (t))
SN (t+ ∆t)− SN (t)
∆t = −δSSN (t)
+ λ
F (X¯N (t+ ∆t))− F (X¯N (t))
∆t
1− F (X¯N (t)) (NH − S
N (t))
Let f(·) be the density function of F (·), we have
lim
∆t→0
F (X¯N (t+ ∆t))− F (X¯N (t))
∆t =f(X¯(t))
We evaluate this expression for ∆t→ 0:
S˙(t) = −δSS(t) + λ f(X¯(t))1− F (X¯(t)) (N − S(t))
We know that the hazard function [12] for the c.d.f F (.) is
given by hF (x) =
f(x)
1−F (x) where f(x) is the corresponding
density function. Hence, the ODE can be written as following,
S˙(t) = −δSS(t) + λhF (X¯(t))(N − S(t))
C. Pure Nash equilibrium
Pi(kU ) is decreasing in the number of updates KU :
Pinf (ψ − 1) ≥ Pinf (ψ)
Ic > 0 and fixed for all players so:
−IcPinf (ψ − 1) ≤ −IcPinf (ψ)
−IcPinf (ψ − 1) ≤ Vj(NU,ψ) = Vj(U,ψ)
Vj(NU,ψ − 1) ≤ Vj(U,ψ)
which is the first Condition (4.1).
Vj(NU,ψ) = Vj(U,ψ) = −Uc = Vj(U,ψ + 1)
and we have the second Condition (4.2).
We conclude that Vj(NU,ψ) = Vj(U,ψ)) is a pure NE.
Hence, a NE at ψ exists for the proposed game.
Second, we will prove by contradiction the uniqueness of
ψ at the NE.
Let kU > ψ, we have:
Vj(NU, kU − 1) > Vj(U, kU − 1) = −Uc = Vj(U, kU )
Vj(NU, kU ) > Vj(U, kU ), so that (4.1) fails.
Let Ku < ψ, we have:
Vj(NU, kU + 1) < Vj(U, kU + 1) = −Uc = Vj(U, kU )
Vj(NU, kU + 1) < Vj(U, kU ), so that (4.2) fails.
The existence and the uniqueness of NE means that the
proposed security game has only one stable point at ψ when
Vj(NU,ψ) = Vj(U,ψ).
D. Mixed Nash equilibrium
Let p the symmetric mixed strategy adopted by every node
in the proposed game, pi = p, ∀i. The new fitness of every
node will be given by:
Vj(p
∗
i , p−i) = p
∗
i
∑N
k=1 C
N−1
k−1 p
k−1
−i (1 − p−i)N−kV (U, k) +
(1− p∗i )
∑N
i=1 C
N−1
k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)N−kV (NU, k)
We have: V (NU, k)=−V (U, k) so,
Vj(p
∗
i , p−i)= (2p
∗
i−1)
∑N
k=1 C
N−1
k−1 p
k−1
−i (1−p−i)N−kV (U, k)
=(2p∗i − 1)D(N, pi)
with D(N, pi) =
∑N
k=1 C
N−1
k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)N−kV (U, k)
A mixed strategy is obtained when D(N, pi) = 0 because for
D(N, pi) < 0 the best response for the node i is pi = 0 and
pi = 1 is a best response when D(N, pi) > 0. We characterize
the mixed equilibrium by
D(N, pi) =
N∑
k=1
CN−1k−1 p
k−1
−i (1− p−i)N−kV (U, k) = 0 (9)
We have D(N, 0) = V (U, 1) and D(N, 1) = V (U,N). From
(3), the infection probability is decreasing with the number of
active antivirus. the fitness of updated system U is decreasing
with the number kU of updates. We get V (U,N) < V (U, 1),
D(N, 0) > D(N, 1).Thus, D(N, pi) is strictly decreasing with
p. Hence, the mixed symmetric NE is unique.
E. Mixers and no-Mixers Nash Equilibrium
1) Equilibrium condition: To prove the necessary condition
to have a NE in our case, we have to show that under this
condition the Non-mixes can’t improve their fitness with
diving from the equilibrium. We have VU (NU , NNU , p) is
decreasing with NU .
VU (NU , NNU , p
∗) ≥ VU (NU + 1, NNU , p∗) and from (7)
VU (NU + 1, NNU , p
∗) = VNU (NU , NNU + 1, p∗)
VU (NU , NNU , p
∗) ≥ VNU (NU , NNU + 1, p∗)
≥ VNU (NU − 1, NNU + 1, p∗)
≥ p∗VU (NU , NNU , p∗)+(1−p∗)VNU (NU −1, NNU +1, p∗)
Therefore, under Condition (7) a player who plays U strategy
cannot improve his fitness by deviating from the strategy
(NU , NNU , p
∗) using any strategy p∗ ∈ [0, 1[.
2) Equilibrium: We have proved that kU=ψ is a pure NE.
Suppose that there is at least one player updates its antivirus.
Let p = 0+, reps. p = 1− be the mixed strategy infinitely
close to zero, reps. to one. We have VU (NU , NNU , p∗) is
strictly decreasing with NU and p∗. We can write (7) as
follows
VU (NU + 1, NNU , 0
+) > VNU (NU , NNU + 1, 0
+)
VU (NU + 1, NNU , 1
−) ≤ VNU (NU , NNU + 1, 1−)
If NU ≥ ψ, then
VU (NU + 1, NNU , 0
+) ≤ VNU (NU , NNU + 1, 0+) wich does
8not satisfy Condition (7) to have a NE.
A NE exists for l < ψ.
For NU +NNU + 1 > N − 1, there is also no NE.
We suppose that we have l < ψ, let NU + NNU + 1 = N
(only one node plays mixed strategy) then ∀p,
VU (NU + 1, NNU , p) = C1 and VNU (NU , NNU + 1, p) = C2
Moreover VU (NU , NNU , p) is strictly decreasing with NU , we
have C2 > C1 which contradicts Condition (7).
We conclude that the NE of type (NU , NNU , p∗) exists only
for NU < ψ and NU +NNU ≤ N − 2.
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